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FOI/PA# 1340830-0

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OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ATTACHE

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MEXICO CITY

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NIS/EP/DD
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368692 "per OGA
6-7-99"

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Date:\ June 6, 1952

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Mexico (66-54)

Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

ReBulet May 26, 1952.

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Letter to Director, 6-6-52
Re: [redacted] (S)

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: *June 10, 1952*

FROM : *D. M. Ladd*

SUBJECT: OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Reference is made to your telephonic conversation with General Walter Bedell Smith of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) this afternoon, who indicated that [REDACTED]

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
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Tele. Rm.
Nease
Gandy

You will recall that in his conversation General Smith
indicated that

[redacted] will be furnished to the Bureau in the near future, at which time it will be reviewed for any appropriate comments or observations.

ACTION:

The attached pages will be returned to General Smith via liaison channels.

Attachment

SJP:lw

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29 JUN 25 1952

EX-99.

6/28/52

Ken. Smith thanked.
not contacted before since he
has been on a vacation.

00 JUL 3 1952 *SP.*

~~SECRET~~

MR. A. H. BELMONT

April 2, 1952

V. P. Keay

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On March 26, 1952, the Bureau Liaison
representative interviewed [redacted]

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The Liaison Agent reviewed [redacted]

(S)

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Attachment

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JUN 13 1952

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : V. P. Keane

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PUBLICITY CONCERNING

DATE: June 17, 1952

PURPOSE:

To call your attention to an article concerning the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which appeared in the June, 1952, issue of the publication, "USA."

BACKGROUND:

Attached is an article entitled, "Is our Intelligence System Reliable?" written by George Fielding Eliot, which appeared in the June, 1952, issue of the publication, "USA."

The article is complimentary to the CIA. Mr. Eliot reviews the growth of the agency since its inception in 1946 under the National Intelligence Authority and its further development under the National Security Act of 1947. He stresses the fact that the CIA went through "growing pains"; that it struggled through several handicaps while Admiral Hillenkoetter was Director; and that the agency really came of age under the leadership of General Walter Bedell Smith.

Mr. Eliot reviewed the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 which pertained to the creation of the CIA and in this regard he pointed out that the CIA did not have any internal security or police powers and that the Act preserved the "existing intelligence processes" of other Government agencies.

The Bureau is mentioned in connection with the early growth of the CIA. It was stated that the older intelligence agencies fought tooth and nail against any "invasion" of their prerogatives. Mr. Eliot then wrote that "the FBI took a dim view of CIA's taking over certain activities in Latin America which FBI had been performing."

Mr. Eliot made complimentary remarks concerning the "courage, good temper, and quiet self-effacement with which

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Attachment

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JUN 30 1952

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5 JUL 10 1952

Admiral Hillenkoetter struggled along", but he left most of his compliments for General Smith.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

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ENCLOSURE

be prepared to revise a whole series of deep-seated attitudes. Retirement must be made one of the goals of life, like getting an education, earning a living, and raising a family. It must be given the status of an achievement, an entry into a new phase of life, and not of casting out into obscurity and the imminence of death. Our social and civic life will have to expand to take care of millions of people with time on their hands, with a new and far greater emphasis on the sedate hobbies, and church, community and philanthropic work. The retired person will have to be convinced, in order to be happy, that his nonprofit interests are as important as his job was, and society will have to agree with him genuinely.

We must be prepared, too, to push forward in our economy the productive power of those remaining in the labor force, so they can replace the loss of the retired workers' contribution and produce enough to bear the burden of pension payments. We also must be prepared for constant pressure to increase retirement benefits — at the very least, to keep them abreast of inflation or rising living standards; at the probable maximum, to make them equivalent to the earnings while employed.


For the present, the whole force of wise social policy seems to point toward the abandonment of 65 for compulsory retirement, and the substitution of a system of voluntary retirement within a wide range, perhaps from 60 to 70. The worker whose health required it could quit before 65; the vigorous and productive man could stay at

his job until 70 or possibly later.

Our faculty at the Graduate School of Public Health at the University of Pittsburgh recently completed a thick monograph on the health aspects of the retirement problems for a conference which assembled at Arden House on the Harriman Campus of Columbia University. In this comprehensive review of available data, we found that there was very little accurate knowledge, derived from competent investigation, in the whole field. There is a general conclusion that use tends to preserve faculties, and disuse promotes and hastens their degeneration. Each job and each person are in a balance of stresses. We honestly do not know the point where work ceases to promote health and well-being and becomes a strain which cannot be born without injury.

From this point of view, I see no reason to fix such a point arbitrarily at 65. A vast opportunity for fruitful research lies in the subject, and the sooner we have the essential research, the better the judgment will be.

Of one thing, we can be sure. The pressure of events is intensifying the problem every day. The number of people over 65 in our population is increasing every year, in its own count and in proportion to our whole population. Their health, their well-being, their happy old age, and their contribution to society will be growing factors in our life which we will find of prime consideration. Today, there are 12 million Americans over 65; in 1975, there will be 21 million. That many people will not rest quietly on anybody's shelf.



"ANOTHER INTELLIGENCE BLUNDER!" That was the instant accusation hurled by a pack of frightened congressmen in June, 1950, upon hearing that the Korean bombshell had burst. For three years they had put up with the new Central Intelligence Agency and its growing pains. Now the CIA had failed to warn Congress of a major military threat.

There was, of course, an investigation. Facing a semicircle of anxious, angry Senators, CIA's director, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, calmly produced piece by piece the documentary evidence

which proved beyond all argument that CIA had warned the policy-makers well in advance of the North Korean troop concentrations above the 38th parallel, and had made what proved a very shrewd estimate of the Red numbers, organization, and armament—and their offensive intentions.

The Senators sat for a moment in stunned silence when Hillenkoetter had finished. Then one Senator spoke his mind:

"But, Admiral," he cried, "why didn't you see that something was done about this information?"

"Senator," said Hillenkoetter, "the duty of an intelligence agency is to present facts, not to make policy."

Major Eliot is a noted commentator on affairs related to our national security.

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olent aegis of the United Nations.

But it soon became clear that makeshift policy and pious hopes would not do in the face of the Soviet power bloc. We had not forgotten Pearl Harbor. There was a rising demand for effective policy-making machinery, for effective defense organization. And it followed as the night the day that we could have neither unless we began with a fact-finding agency to provide the body of knowledge on which to base policies and military plans.

The National Security Act of 1947—largely the result of the patient, tireless efforts of the late James Forrestal—tried to provide answers to these problems. It established our first top planning agency, the National Security Council, and it gave the NSC as its fact-finder the Central Intelligence Agency. When that act became law in July, 1947, the United States for the first time acquired a national intelligence service with a statutory foundation.

Chiefly, the new organization, under the terms of the act, was to provide the much-needed clearing-house for the information obtained by others: by the far-flung net of State Department activities, by the Army's G-2, by the Office of Naval Intelligence, by the Air Force Intelligence, and by other government departments. CIA was supposed to "correlate" and "evaluate" this mass of information—that is, to sift out fact from conjecture, reconcile contradictions, eliminate duplication, produce an end product which policy-makers could rely upon, and see that this product was distributed to those who needed it. CIA was also required to advise the

National Security Council as to all intelligence activities relating to the national security and make appropriate recommendations for the coordination of such activities. CIA was not given direct authority to coordinate; but, considering that the members of the NSC are the President of the United States as chairman, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board, a statute-backed right to advise and recommend to such a body acquires a formidable character.

Finally, CIA was empowered to "perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally," and "which other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." In other words, CIA was not to be merely a coordinator; it could operate on its own if there were gaps to be filled. But ancient suspicions and jealousies die hard, and the law as drawn was amended by Congress in two respects: first, to deny specifically to CIA any internal security or police powers; and, second, to preserve to the several departments their existing intelligence processes.

On the whole, it was a good law—a great step forward. But, like every other law that has ever been printed on paper, it did not produce miracles immediately. The first need of the new agency was for capable, experienced men and women. This was a need not easily

filled, as the newly appointed director, Rear Admiral Hillenkoetter, quickly discovered. A few good people had been inherited from OSS. But where were the others to come from? The body of experience was, not great, since intelligence on a national scale was a new thing in America. Career officers of the services were still shy of the "intelligence" brand. Capable civilians of standing and merit were reluctant to give up established careers for the uncertainty of this new venture—and Hillenkoetter's attempts to found a career intelligence service by enlisting young people straight out of college met with the same reluctance. "Can you promise me a secure future?" was the question which Hillenkoetter could not yet answer honestly in the affirmative. CIA represented a new idea on trial. It had yet to come of age, to establish itself as a permanent governmental unit.

In those early days, there were not lacking voices prophesying CIA's early demise, voices saying—"That outfit won't last through the next Congress, or certainly not after the first stupid blunder that's sure to come." A new agency always has trouble, as Hanson Baldwin remarks, "in establishing itself in politically jealous, power-conscious Washington." This was a heavy burden to lay on the shoulders of a young rear admiral of less than a year's seniority in grade. The older intelligence agencies fought tooth and nail against any "invasion" of their prerogatives. Army G-2 quarrelled with CIA over who was to do what abroad; the State Department worried for months over the question of whether its

Ambassadors and Ministers should have authority over CIA personnel in various countries; the FBI took a dim view of CIA's taking over certain activities in Latin America which FBI had been performing. But the big trouble was—and remains—the old, old problem of departmental interpretation.

CIA was there to get at the facts, rock-bottom facts, impartially determined in the light of the best available evidence, and filled in by educated guesses and careful deduction only where absolutely essential and with guess and deduction duly labelled as such. It is natural that each departmental intelligence service will look at the facts from the point of view of its own interests. In any over-all survey of Soviet military strength, for example, one would expect Naval Intelligence to lay chief emphasis on Soviet submarine activities, the Air Force to give first priority to Soviet air power, and the Army to present the mass of Soviet divisions as the chief menace. But when it comes to presenting the final consolidated report, it isn't always easy to get agreement as to how this report should be weighted. Cries of "Kill the umpire!"—or their equivalent—are not unknown in CIA conference rooms.

Yet somehow the CIA took form and functioned amid all these growing pains. The numerous criticisms—some well-founded, others far less so—brought about in the Summer of 1948 the appointment of a committee of distinguished civilians with wartime intelligence experience (Allen W. Dulles, William H. Jackson and Mathias F. Correa) to make recommendations

for improvements and necessary changes. The committee did a helpful job. But much credit is due to the courage, good temper and quiet self-effacement with which Rear Admiral Hillenkoetter struggled along, eliminating chair-warmers and "empire builders," bringing in a trickle of new personnel when he could get good people, doing the best he could with second-raters when he had to, and on occasion jeopardizing his own naval career by remaining impartial in the face of some naval preconception.

Hillenkoetter was scheduled to return to the Navy, however, and was longing for sea duty. So he went to command a cruiser division in Korean waters, and in October, 1950, CIA had a new director, Lieutenant General (now General) Walter Bedell Smith, USA.

Smith brought to CIA his great gifts of command and of persuasion, his three years of experience in the Moscow embassy and as a participant in every international conference during that period, and the prestige of high rank and of distinguished war service as Eisenhower's Chief of Staff.

He came to CIA, moreover, at a time when the Korean war was stepping up appropriations and when men of substance could be called upon for service with some assurance of favorable reactions.

It is no injustice to Hillenkoetter to say that with the appointment of Bedell Smith CIA came of age. It acquired a chief who could not be disregarded by anyone in the Government, however high in authority. It had won through its period of growing pains. It had weathered the Korean storm with

credit, and it came well out of the later uproar over the Chinese intervention in North Korea, again well able to prove that whatever had gone wrong, CIA had been there with the information. Its prestige as an impartial, reliable source of vital knowledge was established. Not easily would its warnings be set aside again.

Now Smith could start building a permanent structure with some assurance for the future. The basic truth upon which CIA was founded at last had been accepted as established gospel: that national intelligence was a task far beyond the scope of any single agency.

Not only is the field of its research world-wide from the geographical viewpoint, but today it must produce far more than a mere list of regiments or air wings or fortified places. The sources of national power cover the whole range of human activity—military, political, economic, and psychological.

As a young officer, the writer was told: "Military intelligence is not the sun illumining the world, but a searchlight poking into dark corners." But today, with one-fourth of the whole land surface of the globe deliberately blacked out to the rest of mankind, with all normal sources of information denied and the most elaborate precautions taken to preserve secrecy as to every detail, something more than an intermittent searchlight survey is required.

It isn't easy for Americans to understand the grave difficulties imposed by this handicap. It isn't only the police precautions which prevent or restrict all entry and movement of foreigners in the Sov-

iet domain. It is the drying up of every source of information such as is freely available about our own and other free countries—the usual channels of news, trade and credit information, production figures, the exchange of scientific and educational data, maps, books, magazines, all the means by which facts and thoughts flow freely across national boundaries. At least half of the fact-items in the Soviet estimates prepared by CIA with painful, piece-meal effort could be culled as to our own country from the World Almanac, the Census Bureau's "Statistical Abstract of the United States," a set of contoured maps, and a file of any good daily newspaper.

These "national estimates" are the final end product of CIA's labors. There's one for every developing situation—it's as important to understand an ally as to penetrate an enemy's secrets—but the Soviet estimate has No. 1 priority. The estimates are never static. As soon as one is completed, revision begins. They are the result of day-by-day effort which never ceases. CIA can't afford rest periods.

The process of putting a national estimate together has been compared to solving a jig-saw puzzle. You might imagine a huge incomplete jig-saw puzzle—with many pieces missing and large irregular blank spaces all through it—laid out on the floor of a room. Every day come men from Army, Navy, Air Force, State and other activities, each bringing a new piece or perhaps a handful of pieces. It is immediately clear where some of the new pieces fit. Others don't seem to fit at all. They may belong

in the middle of some of the blank spaces. They have to be set aside until other pieces which match them are obtained. Or some pieces already fitted in may now seem not to fit quite precisely—one of the new pieces fits more evenly. A whole section of the puzzle thus may have to be readjusted. The picture disclosed may be wholly altered in character by this change. There will be lively argument between those who were proud of the original arrangement and those who insist that the change is more nearly accurate. Finally the time will come when the picture is as nearly complete as seems likely for the time being. Then the blank spaces have to be filled in by guess and deduction from the general color and form of the picture as shown by the pieces already assembled. The result is a national estimate, as of right then. The search for new pieces and the replacement of old pieces continue.

What CIA strives to produce in these national estimates is a firm guide upon which policy-makers and planners can rely. When each estimate (or rather each edition of each estimate) approaches completion, there is a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, presided over by the director of Central Intelligence, and including intelligence representatives of the military services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (which handles domestic aspects of intelligence work). There is usually a brisk discussion on points as to which full agreement has not yet been reached. Here, as

IS OUR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM RELIABLE?

already observed, the director of Central Intelligence must be the impartial umpire.

Not the least of General Smith's contributions to CIA is his success in this delicate and troublesome task. He never consents to "compromise for the sake of compromise." He will not permit an estimate to be watered down.

Political influence has never succeeded—so far, anyway, but keep your fingers crossed—in filtering into the CIA. Facts, as Dulles remarks, are neither Republican nor Democratic: which itself is a fact that may arise to haunt some candidates in the current election. Presidential candidates might well reflect soberly on the embarrassment of being elected on the basis of vigorous assertions which—when the candidate becomes President and is duly briefed by the CIA—may turn out to be all hogwash.

While—as already observed—CIA's growing prestige plus the Korean crisis have enabled General Smith to obtain the services of many distinguished civilians with special competence for intelligence work, this is only a stop-gap. The agency must develop its own career

intelligence corps. It is better able to do so today because it can now say to young men and women: "Intelligence is a serious and honorable profession which offers you a lifetime job in the service of your country." Plans are well advanced for the start of such a career service for CIA personnel.

The big difficulty—the closed mind in high places—is still here. It is not as dangerous as it was, largely due to the vigor of some of General Smith's presentations and the fact that CIA generally has turned out a lot nearer right than any who have questioned its findings. But since General Smith will not always be director of CIA, it is of vital importance that the agency itself should acquire, as it is acquiring, the confidence and prestige which in the future will give the country the assurance that facts, however unpleasant or distasteful, will be looked squarely in the eye by those who must make the decisions of policy or of action.

We are building a good intelligence service for the first time in our history. When we have learned to use it, we can all breathe more easily.



"Andy's on his way to match wits with a fish!"

the long-delayed "BIG PINCH"

Just what happened to the expected shortages of civilian goods? Here is part of the reason why we Americans still are enjoying a lot of "butter"

By Robert L. Dunne



THE American consumer must be pleasantly confused at this point in the mobilization program.

In his neighborhood store he sees a decorative display of copper-plated pots and pans. New stoves and other appliances flash chrome handles; a little less, perhaps, than the old models, but still it's chrome. Retail shelves are packed with gadgets and necessities containing "critical" materials.

In the garage, his 1950 car isn't getting any younger, but he has no concern about the availability (the money is another story) of a new replacement, replete with white sidewall tires and shiny metal ornaments. All over town, new business and residential buildings are rising.

Thinking back to the scare headlines of only a few months ago, Mr. Consumer cannot help but voice puzzled queries: "What

happened? Where did all this 'butter' come from? I thought it would be in 'guns' by now!"

For months, ex-mobilization chief Charles E. Wilson trumpeted the approach of a "big pinch" in civilian goods because of the scarcity of steel, copper, aluminum, nickel, zinc, cobalt and whatnot.

And at one stage last Fall, Mr. Wilson peered through his bifocals at the statistical charts prepared so carefully by his staff in the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Defense Production Administration, the National Production Authority, et al, and proclaimed sadly that the time for the "pinch" had arrived indeed. Consumers no longer could expect to buy what they wanted because the defense program would thereafter require most of the materials.

Mr. Wilson was technically right, of course. The time had ar-

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June 25, 1952

Director, FBI

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In Reply, Please Refer to
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NO NUMBER

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION SAC LETTER U
Series 1952

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 27, 1952

MEMO FOR MR.	HOOVER	BROWN, B. C.	HENNRICH	PRICE
	TOLSON	CALLAHAN	HOOD	RENNEBERGER
	LADD	CALLAN	HOLLOMAN	ROGERS
	NICHOLS	CLEVELAND	HURLEY, L. P.	SCATTERDAY
	BEIMONT	CONRAD	JONES, M. A.	SIMON
	CLEGG	CROSBY	KEAY	SIZOO
	CONNELLEY	DeLOACH	LAUGHLIN	STANLEY
	GLAVIN	DOWNING	LEONARD	STEIN
	HARBO	EAMES	MAILEY	TAMM, Q.
	ROSEN	EDWARDS, H. L.	MASON, E. D.	TROTTER
	TRACY	EGAN	McGUIRE	VECHERY
	BAUMGARDNER	FEENEY	MOHR	WHERRY
	BOWLES	FLYNN	NAUGHTEN	WICK
	BRANIGAN	GEARTY, G.	PARSONS	WINTERROWD
		GRESHAM	PENNINGTON	

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Very truly yours,
John Edgar Hoover
Director

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 30, 1952

FROM : D. M. Ladd *pl*

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SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg ✓
Glavin ✓
Nichols ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Harbo ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

[REDACTED] furnished the following for your information on a very confidential basis.

He advised that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also stated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DML:dad

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-7-99 BY 60267 NIS/EP/DO
368692

RECORDED - 139

62-80750-1873

JUL 1 1952

60 JUL 10 1952

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AK*

FROM : V. P. Keay *V.P.K. J*

SUBJECT: *1* CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND SECURITY

DATE: July 7, 1952

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

es2-1 b3

This is to advise that [redacted]
[redacted]
has been replaced by [redacted] who has
been very cooperative with the Bureau, is [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] has been very friendly and cooperative
with the Bureau.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP: jmr fine

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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368692

RECORDED - 10
INDEXED - 15

62-80750-1874
JUL 9 1952

65 JUL 15 1952

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 19, 1952

FROM : SAC, New York (47-new)

SUBJECT: ~~PANAGRA AIRLINES~~~~HANDLING OF MANIFEST IN SOUTH AMERICA~~

Reurlet 6/13/52.

Mr. DOUGLAS CAMPBELL, Vice-President and Genl. Manager, of the PANAGRA AIRLINES Division of the Pan-American Airlines, 135 E. 42nd St., N.Y.C., stated that he would notify the Lima, Peru Division to immediately discontinue the use of the envelopes marked "FBI".

Mr. CAMPBELL suggested that as their company had been in the habit of furnishing duplicate manifests to the FBI during the last war, when the Lima Office received a similar suggestion from CIA, they simply were attempting to use up the stock of envelopes they had on hand.

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368692

RECORDED - 6

INDEXED - 6

162-80750-1875

JUN 24 1952

EX-112

CO. 112

JFI:EDC

89 JUL

EXPEDITE PROCESSING.
JUN 27 1952

The Director

July 3, 1952

D. M. Ladd

HARRY A. JARVINEN
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-7-99 BY 60267NIS/EP/DD
368692

PURPOSE:

To recommend (1) that the Department be requested to advise what investigation it desires the Bureau to conduct in this case: (2) [REDACTED]

(3) that the Seattle Office be instructed to expedite its background investigation of the subject.

BACKGROUND:

Subject is under indictment on charges that he knowingly and willfully advised the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI of a false story concerning an alleged trip to be made to Europe and the Soviet Union by Owen Lattimore. [REDACTED]

DETAILS:

As you are aware, the Department is pushing the prosecution of the subject and has sent an attorney from Washington, D. C., to assist the United States Attorney in Seattle, Washington, in preparing this case for presentation to the Federal Grand Jury as well as for the trial which is tentatively set for September 14, 1952.

If we are charged with responsibility for investigating this case, ordinarily we would interview all individuals who would have any knowledge of the pertinent facts of this case. These individuals would include the subject, Lattimore, George Kahin, who allegedly purchased the tickets for Lattimore from Jarvinen. [REDACTED]

In this regard, it is noted that Jarvinen told Bureau Agents that the idea

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Attachment

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

46-10356
JUL 21 1952
24628
one
me

162-80750-
NOT RECORDED
75 JUL 14 1952

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

for the false story originated at a discussion some time ago between him and his friends, whose names he would not divulge. In newspaper accounts of interviews conducted by reporters with Jarvinen, it is set out that he told CIA of the details of this false story at a cocktail party attended by him and CIA representatives. It would be logical to ascertain the identities of the friends with whom Jarvinen discussed this story but since Jarvinen has been indicted, it is not deemed advisable to reinterview him at this time. It would also be logical to [redacted] b3

Jarvinen was indicted under Section 1001, Title 18, charging him with making false statements to Agents of the CIA and FBI. It would appear that we have jurisdiction in this case; nevertheless, contrary to usual procedure, the case was presented to a Grand Jury before a complete investigation was conducted. It is felt, therefore, that we should have specific instructions from the Department as to what investigation is desired [redacted] b3

[redacted] testified before the Grand Jury. Attached is a letter to the Department summing up what we have done in this case and requesting advice as to any further investigation to be conducted.

Regardless of what investigation the Department wants, it is felt we should conduct a full background investigation of Jarvinen for our own protection. In this regard, leads are at present outstanding for St. Louis to check Army records and New York and the Washington Field Office to review Immigration and Naturalization Service records. The receipt of this data will enable us to check with G-2. There is attached a teletype to Seattle, St. Louis, New York, and Washington Field Offices instructing that a complete background investigation be conducted expeditiously.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

~~SECRET~~

DATE: July 8, 1952

FROM : V. P. Keagy

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b3

Tolson ☒
 Ladd ☐
 Clegg ☐
 Glavin ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Rosen ☐
 Tracy ☐
 Harbo ☐
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☐
 Tele. Rm. ☐
 Nease ☐
 Gandy ☐

b1
b3

SP7 dec/alm

6/15/94 C.A. # 88-1826

ALL CLASSIFICATION PER
CFA REVIEW OF 6/15/94

Classified by SP4 LEO/mif
 Declassify on: OADR 10/19/89
 9823/200/ME 11/2/93 C.A. #
 88-1826

b3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNRECORDED - 131

UNINDEXED - 131

JUL 11 1952

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JUL 22 1952

62-80750-1876

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 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
 36892 "Per OGA 6-7-99"

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

ACTION:

None. For your information.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
AIR COURIER

RECORDED - 56

EX-121 62-80750-1877

Date: June 27, 1952

To: Legal Attache
Havana, Cuba

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[REDACTED]

b3

1-Foreign Service Desk (Detached)

JJM:lng

(NOTE: Liaison Agent Papich is of the opinion that the

[REDACTED]

b3

RECEIVED BY 60267NIS/EP/DD
6-7-99

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RECEIVED
JUL 27 4 56 PM '52

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

LEGAT
7 JUL 2
COMM - FBI

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

WA TO : Director, FBI
FROM : Legal Attache, Havana, Cuba
SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DATE: June 18, 1952
Havana, Cuba

In the past we have identified the above named organization as CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or (C.I.A.).

b3

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JUN 23 1952

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EX-121

62-74750-1877

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DATE 6-7-99 BY 60267 NIS/EP/DD
368692

1003
62-30150-1878
ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT:

INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: May 1, 1952

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Harbo _____
952 Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Laughlin _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

b1
b3

IS

§

b1
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RWW: JHK

cc New Orleans

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MA 13 1952

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ MAY 27 1960

FEB 3 1964

1-171

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *abz*

DATE: July 16, 1952

FROM : V. P. Keogh *PK I de*SUBJECT:

b3

Tolson ☒

Ladd ☐

Clegg ☐

Glavin ☒

Nichols ☒

Rosen ☐

Tracy ☐

Harbo ☐

Belmont ☐

Mohr ☐

Tele. Room ☐

Nease ☐

Gandy ☐

b3

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ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:lw

RECORDED-37

EX. - 106

61 JUL 24 1952

277

62-80750-1880

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Clegg	✓
Mr. Glavin	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tracy	✓
Mr. Laughlin	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Holloman	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

Spies—

CIA Role in Lattimore Case Was an Accident

By William Hines

A number of people seemed to have jumped to the conclusion, as a result of the Owen Lattimore passport incident, that our Central Intelligence Agency may be trying to convert itself into an American version of Russia's OGPU. But no one should lose sleep over this one. The supersecret Government spy network seems to be as unhappy as Mr. Lattimore himself that the fiasco ever occurred.

It was a part-time informer's tip to a CIA operative at Seattle, Wash., a little more than a month ago that set off the explosive Lattimore incident.

The tipster, a travel agency employee, told the CIA man of a trip behind the iron curtain allegedly being planned by Mr. Lattimore, controversial Johns Hopkins professor who was scored last week by a Senate group as a "conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy."

As a result of the tip, the State Department ordered customs officials to prevent Mr. Lattimore from leaving the country. The supposedly confidential stop order got national publicity. Mr. Lattimore said that not only was he not going anywhere, but that he did not even have a valid passport. He denied trying to buy tickets from the Seattle agency or any one else. The FBI investigated, found the CIA tipster's story to be false, and brought charges against the informer that resulted in his indictment several days ago on charges of giving false information to a Federal agency. The informant, Harry Jarvinen, pleaded innocent last week.

Waspish Acceptance

The upshot was that an embarrassed State Department canceled the stop order and publicly apologized to Mr. Lattimore—an apology that the Baltimore educator accepted waspishly.

It might all have blown over almost unnoticed but for the fact that Mr. Lattimore, in his reply to the State Department's apology, bade the CIA remember its place in a free society.

What is CIA's place? Is it a neo-fascist Gestapo? And how did it get into the act in the first place?

The Central Intelligence Agency, now five years old, is the Nation's first real answer to the pressing question of international intelligence. But the emphasis is on the adjective "international." CIA has no domestic spy functions; in fact, it is prohibited by law from engaging in this activity.

A 'Silent Service'

The highly secret agency operates directly under the President's National Security Council. It correlates intelligence information from all the other agencies of the Government with intelligence networks—the armed services, State, FBI, Treasury and so on. And it operates an extensive spy setup of its own. Like Britain's noted intelligence organization, CIA is truly a "silent service." Getting into its headquarters in the old Office of Strategic Services area at 2430 E street N.W. is only slightly less difficult than getting out of Alcatraz, and infinitely more troublesome than visiting the Atomic Energy Commission.

When the 80th Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, it wrote into the measure a stern prohibition against domestic snooping on the part of CIA. The section creating the agency provided "that the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal-security functions." Far from being set up as a Gestapo, or having the power to become a secret police, the CIA was created absolutely toothless. A knock on the door by a CIA agent could—and still can—be answered by the shout, "Go 'way, boy, you bother me."

Business Goes Seaward

"Our business begins at the shoreline and continues seaward," is the way one CIA official put it.

Then how did CIA get involved in the Lattimore incident? Purely by accident, says CIA. According to the agency, its Seattle operative had been in contact with Jarvinen for a long time. Jarvinen's value to CIA lay in his travel-bureau affiliation. As a result of his business, he had extensive information on overseas movements, and frequently handed tips to CIA. Jarvinen's reputation for accuracy in the past had been good.

When he told the CIA man about Mr. Lattimore, the CIA operative was faced with a choice, the agency said. He could have thrown the tip into the wastebasket as valueless to CIA. Or he could have passed the tip—and the buck—to Washington. He chose the latter course. CIA says the Seattle agent's decision was correct.

As a long-standing matter of course, the CIA says, it has channels through which it passes information to other agencies. Frequently CIA gets tips—like the Lattimore one—of no official interest to it. The agency sends these along to the interested bureau.

Of course, CIA and other agencies do evaluate intelligence that falls into their respective bailiwicks. CIA, for instance, is the top Government bureau for collecting, collating and deciding on the accuracy of foreign intelligence. FBI builds its cases domestically on the basis of information it gets and evaluates. The Army may collect from everywhere scraps of intelligence about an enemy, but it is up to the Army to assess this information. The rule-of-thumb is that the various agencies do not go outside their own spheres in evaluating information they receive.

CIA makes its negative role in intelligence crystal-clear: It is not a domestic spy agency. But about its positive role—what it does do—CIA is silent. That it has undercover agents spotted all over the globe is not a matter of public knowledge; it is merely an educated surmise. How many people it has doing what jobs is a well-kept CIA secret.

After a number of false starts, CIA got cracking about a year and a half ago under Gen. Eisenhower's stony-faced former chief of staff, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith. Although nominally a civilian agency, CIA is crawling with military brass, both active and retired. This is less surprising than it might seem at first blush, and not at all sinister. Professional intelligence men, outside the military services, still are in short supply. It probably will be many years before a corps of career men is developed by CIA.

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JUL 21 1952

Donald L. Hines is on the CIA "grave train!"

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62-80750-1882

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~~SECRET~~

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
July 16, 1952

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~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

RS

Director, FBI

Re: [REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3

Dear Sir:

ReBulet July 2, 1952.

[REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

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368692 "Per OGA
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162-80750-1883
JUL 23 1952

~~SECRET~~

60 JUL 30 1952

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The above is for the information of the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

Martin Carlsen

MARTIN CARLSEN
LA

MC:jar

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: *June 24, 1952*

FROM : V. P. K. Reddy

SUBJECT: ~~CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY~~
~~BRIEFING REGARDING THE~~
~~ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS~~

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele.
Nease
Gandy

You will recall that on March 28, 1952, the CIA held a conference for the purpose of briefing certain Government intelligence agencies concerning the organization and functions of the CIA. Inspector Laughlin and Liaison Agent Papich attended the conference

Attachments (2)

SJP:lw (11)

RECORDED - 68

INDEXED 68

JUL 22 1952

FX-25

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DATE 6-8-99 BY 60267 NIS/EP/DD

368692

53 AUG 1 1952

[Redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

b3

[Redacted]

MR. A. H. BELMONT

July 16, 1952

V. P. Keay

[REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1
b3

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S)

ACTION:

None. For your information

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*

DATE: July 18, 1952

FROM : V. P. Keay *PK*SUBJECT: *ls* CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BRIEFING REGARDING THE
ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to my memorandum dated June 24,
 1952, wherein I directed your attention to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3

ACTION:

None. For your information. [REDACTED]

(11) SJP:lw

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EX-25

162-80750-1885
JUL 22 1952311
7 JUL 31 1952

~~SECRET~~Office Memorandum ~~SECRET~~ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTTO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*

DATE: July 18, 1952

FROM : V. P. *Reay* *2/1*SUBJECT: (S)

b1

b3

☒ Tolson
☐ Ladd
☐ Clegg
☒ Glavin
☒ Nichols
☐ Rosen
☐ Tracy
☐ Harbo
☐ Belmont
☐ Mohr
☐ Tele. Room
☐ Nease
☐ Gandy

File

You will recall that the Owen Lattimore incident in Seattle, Washington, has been a source of considerable embarrassment to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

b3

2-1

b1

b3

ACTION:

None. For your information.

Attachment

SJP:lw

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JUL 22 1952

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EX. - 73

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368692

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 1, 1952

FROM : V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S) G. L. J. [REDACTED]

b1
b3

Tolson	
Ladd	
Clegg	
Glavin	
Nichols	
Rosen	
Tracy	
Harbo	
Belmont	
Lois	
Tele. Room	
Nease	
Gandy	

[REDACTED] (S) Callahan

[REDACTED] (S) b1
b3

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

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65 AUG 13 1952 RECORDED-37

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EX - 3

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-80750-1889

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 10, 1952

FROM : V. P. Kezzy

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg ✓
Glavin ✓
Nichols ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Harbo ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Nease ✓
Gandy ✓

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b1
b3

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SJP:lw

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SP7 C.A. ALM

6/15/94 C.A. #88-1826

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CIA REVIEW of 6/2/94

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368692 "Per OGA
6-8-99"

SECRET

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice**

1000 Masonic Temple Building
New Orleans, Louisiana
July 21, 1952

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Laughlin _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR, FBI

Referral/Consult

RE: [REDACTED]

Handwritten:
G. J. [unclear]
W. [unclear]

Dear Sir:

On July 18, 1952, during the current inspection of the
New Orleans office, I was invited to lunch by [REDACTED] Referral/Consult
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] b6

[REDACTED] was most profuse in expressing admiration
for you, officials of the FBI, and the Bureau as a whole. He
indicated his appreciation for the cooperation rendered him by SAC
Lopez and the New Orleans Office. b7C

b1

b3

Referral/Consult



CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NIS/EP/DD

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62-80750-1891

68 AUG 14 1952

SECRET

1952
PERS. FILES

Handwritten signature: [unclear]

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR, FBI
7/21/52

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] b1
[REDACTED] b3

[REDACTED] (S) Referral/Consult

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (S)

Referral/Consult

I indicated to [REDACTED] that I would relay his complimentary remarks to you and that I felt sure you would be most pleased to hear that he was doing so well in the New Orleans territory.

Very truly yours,

Cartha D. DeLoach

CARTHA D. DeLOACH
Inspector

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

DATE: July 2, 1952
 SECTION b3

See Top/Serial
Form 4/74

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

b3

b1
b3ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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SJP:lw

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 EX-129

62-80750-1892
 17 AUG 4 1952

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UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-80750-1892

~~SECRET~~

(S)

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(S)

(S) (u)

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the instant memorandum be referred to the Espionage and Internal Security Units for information purposes.

It is shocking that
such waste & looseness
can prevail & nothing
can be done about it.

h

~~SECRET~~

COPY

DATE: July 23, 1952

5-113 CIA

TO: THE DIRECTOR

FROM: D. M. LADD

SUBJECT:
INFORMATION CONCERNING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

FILE #	2,4,367
APPEAL #	
CIVIL ACT. #	
S.D. #	12356
DATE	6-11-55
INITIALS	DB

b3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

(S) (S)

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(S) (S)

(S) (S)

Attachment

JFS:hke

5 AUG 11 1952

ENCL

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 2144-108
Declassify on: OADR
8-21-85


62-80750-2

NOT RECORDED

136 AUG 4 1952

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-77306-24

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~131312~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~b1
b3ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

You will be kept advised of any pertinent developments in this regard. We will, of course, not become involved in any way in this controversy.

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR, FBI

July 23, 1952

SAC, SAN JUAN

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
CARIBBEAN AREA

PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

During the regular weekly Intelligence Conference held at San Juan on this date, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

In this connection it is to be noted that

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

According to the information which was informally discussed [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

RCG:mfs

~~SECRET~~

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NIS/EP/DO
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
388692 "Per OGA
6-8-99"

1-1-51
8-1-51
8-1-51
8-1-51

~~SECRET~~

Letter to Director, FBI

July 23, 1952

Re: Intelligence Matters
Caribbean Area

[REDACTED]

(S)

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It is emphasized that most of the information which Officers locally have received is informal and apparently not entirely clear at the present time. I, therefore, hesitate to advance these data at this time as being completely factual and accurate but thought the Bureau would be interested in the fact that

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED]

b1
b3

Referral/Consult

Again, it is emphasized that they have no specific information concerning this but they thought I would be interested in what was being discussed.

It is suggested that the Bureau may wish to query the Liaison Officer in Panama [REDACTED]

b1
b3

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED] (S)

I again wish to emphasize that these data were furnished me in confidence on an informal basis and inquiries made pursuant thereto should not disclose the source of our information, which would be compromising to the Officers concerned.

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*

FROM : V. P. Keay *VPK*

SUBJECT: LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DATE: July 29, 1952

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols *✓*
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has advised Liaison Agent Papich that Mr. Kirkpatrick has been stricken with polio and is now a patient at the Gallinger Hospital. Kirkpatrick became ill about a week ago and last Friday his illness was diagnosed as non-paralytic poliomyelitis. However, on July 28, 1952, partial paralysis set in one leg and one arm. General Smith stated that his condition is not considered to be critical, but it is believed that he may be subjected to prolonged medical treatment.

General Smith advised that Kirkpatrick's illness has not only touched him personally but he pointed out that the organization would suffer during Kirkpatrick's absence. He elaborated by stating that Kirkpatrick has rapidly developed into an outstanding executive and he has had to depend upon him more than any other CIA official.

As you know, Mr. Kirkpatrick has been very friendly and cooperative with the Bureau since he became Assistant Director of the Office of Special Operations in December, 1951. On all major issues which have cropped up between the CIA and the Bureau he has readily sided with the Bureau point of view. You will recall that he called on the Director about three months ago and made a favorable impression.

RECOMMENDATION:

out That the attached letter be sent to Mr. Kirkpatrick expressing the Director's wishes for a speedy recovery. The letter will be delivered to Mr. Kirkpatrick via liaison channels.

Attachment

SJP:lw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-8-99 BY 60267 NIS/EPD
 368692

RECORDED - 27
 INDEXED - 12

EX - 13

62-80750-1893

AUG 14 1952

RECORDED-113 62-80750-1894

INDEXED-113

Date: July 31, 1952

VIA ARMY COURIER

EX-129

To:

[Redacted]

b3

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b3

Subject:

[Redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-8-99 BY 60267 NIS/EP/DO
368692

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3

[Redacted]

- Tolson _____
- Ladd _____
- Nichols _____
- Belmont _____
- Clegg _____
- Glavin _____
- Harbo _____
- Rosen _____
- Tracy _____
- Laughlin _____
- Mohr _____
- Tele. Rm. _____
- Holloman _____
- Gandy _____

cc - Foreign Service Desk (detached)

NLF:hlm

LEGAT
10 AUG 1952
COMM-FBI

58 AUG 18 1952

[Handwritten signatures and initials]



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Headquarters Caribbean Command
Quarry Heights, Canal Zone
c/o Director of Intelligence
July 11, 1952

VIA AIR MAIL COURIER

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Ninth and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Re: DIA PERSONNEL
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Dear Sir:

[redacted]
[redacted] has been replaced by [redacted]
[redacted]

b3

[redacted] is scheduled to leave the Isthmus during
the latter part of July for Washington, D. C., for reassignment.

This is furnished as a matter of information to the
Bureau.

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DATE 6-8-99 BY 60267 NIS/EPD

Very truly yours,

368692

Frank R. Warner
Frank R. Warner
Special Agent

RECORDED-113

INDEXED-113

EX-113

100-8760-1894

20

6-6

5-1
P. 113
JUL 21 1952

SAC, Seattle

July 29, 1952

RECORDED

62-80750-1895

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

93837

Reference is made to your letter dated July 14, 1952, wherein you described the results of your conversation with [redacted] b3
You indicated that [redacted] was evasive and hesitant with regard to his responsibility of disseminating information to your office.

For your information and future guidance, General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of the CIA, has instructed the various divisions of his agency that information of interest to the Bureau should be immediately disseminated on the field level.

SJP/lng/fjb

(NOTE: [redacted] b3
[redacted])

6-8-99 60267 NIS/EP/DO
368692

JUL 30 8 23 PM '52

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED DIRECTOR

RECEIVED JUL 30 7 22 PM '52

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____

MAILED 16
JUL 31 1952
MAILED 16

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM : SAC, SEATTLE
 SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(4) DATE: July 1, 1952

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reference is made to the case entitled "HARRY A. JARVISEN;
 FAG - OWEN LATTIMORE: ESPIONAGE (R)" (SE File #46-1030) [redacted]

b1

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(S)

b3

The above data is being furnished merely for the Bureau's information, and I might note that in view of the generally bad and extensive publicity which CIA has received in the Seattle Area as a result of this situation, the Agency is regarded in quite a ludicrous light.

RDA:LM

60262 NIS/EP/DD

368692 "Per OGA
 6-8-99"

RECORDED

62-81150-184-5
 [Signature]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 4, 1952

FROM : V. P. Keady

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ARTICLE IN
"LOOK" MAGAZINE DATED AUGUST 12, 1952,
ENTITLED, "INSIDE CIA - THE STORY OF
OUR SPY NETWORK," BY JOHN GUNTHER

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Gandy

PURPOSE:

To advise you regarding favorable publicity given to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the referenced article.

BACKGROUND:

The August 12, 1952, issue of "Look" magazine carries the attached article entitled, "Inside CIA - The Story of our Spy Network," written by the well-known writer, John Gunther. Gunther points out that the CIA has a top responsibility today in making estimates regarding possible Soviet intentions. In addition to the CIA, he refers to the work of the Psychological Strategy Board and he states that the highly classified reports of both agencies help form the basis for our cold-war policy. He stresses the unusual security attached to the operations of the CIA and he briefly describes the history and the functions of the organization. There are brief biographical data set forth concerning CIA officials, such as General Smith, Allen Dulles, Loftus Becker, Walter Reid Wolf, Stuart Hedden, Sherman Kent, and Dr. Raymond Allen. The entire article is very complimentary to the CIA. In this connection Gunther ends with the statement, "The American people can be sure they are doing a first-class job."

Set forth below are some observations concerning statements made by Gunther:

CIA SECURITY:

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368692

It is interesting to note that Gunther referred to CIA's lie detector tests. As you know, the CIA has greatly emphasized that they desired no publicity whatsoever that the agency was using the lie detector. Nevertheless, Gunther was permitted to print the information. The article refers to the methods employed by the CIA in the handling of office trash, such as the burning of confidential notes, worksheets, etc. All of this information is something that the CIA never cares to discuss with anyone, yet reference was made to the matter in some detail in this article.

Attachment

RECORDED-113

INDEXED-113

EX-129

SJR:lw
AUG 21 1952
cc - Mr. Nichols

62-80752-1896
AUG 7 1952
RECEIVED
CIA

CIA officials from time to time have placed considerable security emphasis on the location and number of their offices. Gunther states that the operations take place in 34 different buildings which are widely separated throughout the city.

CIA BUDGET:

Gunther stated that the CIA budget is a taboo subject. He stated that he heard one estimate as being \$75,000,000. He states, "If that is all it is, the CIA is cheap at the price."

b3

REFERENCES TO GENERAL SMITH:

General Smith is described as the individual who has given CIA prestige and stature. It is stated that General Smith has insisted that CIA remain fundamentally a civilian agency. This is very contradictory in view of the many retired service officers who are now employed by the CIA in several top posts. The article states, "The General has the power to smack heads together, but seldom does so. His job is not to affront the Army, the AEC, the State Department, or the FBI, but to get along with them all."

COVERT OPERATIONS OF CIA:

The article did not go too far into this subject but it points out that there is one Deputy Director whose identity is kept a secret and who is responsible for "covert activities."

b3

RECRUITMENT OF PERSONNEL:

The article indicates that General Smith has been able to get really good men to give up their private careers for service to the Government. It is pointed out that Allen Dulles is sacrificing a very lucrative law practice in order to serve his Government "for a comparative pittance."

REFERENCE TO SHERMAN KENT:

Gunther refers to the importance of Sherman Kent, Assistant Director in Charge of the Office of National Estimates. There is a good possibility that Gunther may have been briefed regarding the CIA by Kent or he may have been referred to Kent's book, "Strategic Intelligence." For your information, the aforementioned publication is required reading by CIA employees and it is believed that Kent's writing is the backbone of CIA's intelligence operation philosophy. With regard to Kent's book, which is mentioned by Gunther, reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to you dated June 5, 1950, captioned, "Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy," which sets forth a review of the publication.

REFERENCES TO THE FBI:

The article indicates that before employing an individual, the CIA checks with the Bureau.

In referring to CIA's powers and functions under the National Security Act of 1947 Gunther states, "It has the right to inspect the files of the FBI and other organizations concerned, to the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, and it is responsible only to the National Security Council itself, which means the President." As you know, his reference to the right to inspect the Bureau files is a gross misstatement. The National Security Act of 1947 reads that the Director of the CIA can obtain information from the Director of the FBI through the means of a written request. In this connection it may be noted that in his book Sherman Kent referred to the National Security Act and stated that it was his understanding that the CIA had no right of inspection in the FBI. He pointed out that the FBI enjoyed a "special position."


EXPANSION OF CIA POWERS:

Gunther poses the question, "Should the CIA, instead of being coordinator, be the boss? Should it, in other words, take over all other Government intelligence functions?" Gunther states, "No." He explains that one reason is that neither the Military nor the State Department would agree. He continues by stating that the CIA does not want to be bothered with purely tactical military intelligence.


PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD:

b3


It is interesting to note that the article gave considerable publicity concerning the Psychological Strategy Board,



The individual on the Board who receives the most publicity in the article is Dr. Raymond B. Allen. The Bureau files indicate that he has been somewhat of a controversial figure because of his past links with the Institute of Pacific Relations and because of allegations made that he was pro-Communist.




b3



COMMENTS:

Although CIA officials have not so specifically stated, they have implied to the Liaison Agent that the writing of the referenced article was promoted by the CIA, which appears to be quite obvious.



b3



ACTION:

None. For your information.

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368692

ENCLOSURE

42-80750-1896

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-8-99 BY 60267 NIS/EP/DD
368692

ENCLOSURE

Memo to Mr. Belmont from Mr. Keay, 8-4-52, SJP:lw

RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ARTICLE IN
"LOOK" MAGAZINE DATED AUGUST 12, 1952,
ENTITLED, "INSIDE CIA - THE STORY OF OUR
SPY NETWORK," BY JOHN GUNTHER.

1896
ALL INFO CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-8-99 BY 60267NIS/EP/DD
368692



By JOHN GUNTHER

INSIDE CIA

the story of

OUR SPY NETWORK

Will Russia launch a war this year? From all available evidence, Washington does not think so. Our defense effort today is geared to a gradual increase of strength. There is no surge of activity of the kind that an impending emergency would demand. Policy makers appear certain that the Russians, on the whole, have no immediate incentive for war; that the Soviets believe the punishment they would take would imperil their regime; that Moscow expects to gain more than we by marking time; that it has no hope of winning a war in the near future and still believes the world may

be Russia's without the necessity of undertaking a war.

How does Washington reach these conclusions? Its cool estimate almost certainly stems in large measure from a secret but vital organization that has top responsibility today for knowing what's going on in Russia and elsewhere in the world—the Central Intelligence Agency. Such an organization can determine the fate of America. For this reason, LOOK recently asked one of the country's best reporters to dig for all the publishable facts on the CIA and its associate agency, the Psychological Strategy Board. Here is his report.—THE EDITORS

CEASELESSLY alert in Washington are two super hush-hush organizations dedicated to preserving the security and best interests of the United States against the Soviet Union: Both are as silent as a man with adhesive tape strapped across his mouth. They are like sunken watchtowers, like human seismographs.

One is the Central Intelligence Agency and the other, even less well-known, is the Psychological Strategy Board. Each is autonomous, but they interlock, and their highly "classified" (= secret) reports help form the basis for our cold-war policy.

Upon the quality of their work, the future of the United States vis-à-vis Soviet Russia may well depend.

Recently members of a well-meaning women's organiza-

tion in Washington wanted to pass a resolution publicly commending the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). The CIA was sounded out, whereupon word went down to the women's organization: "If you commend us for good work, you know more about us than you should. And if you know that much about us, we are not doing good work."

The atmosphere around the CIA suggests—let us put it mildly—certain precautions. Every visitor is checked in and out of each office, but the words "Central Intelligence Agency" do not appear on the slip of paper he must fill out.

Every official and employee of CIA, before being hired, must undergo an exhaustive security check. On top of the regular FBI and other checks, the CIA maintains a security office of its own, for further top-secret investigation. Although

CONTINUED



CIA head, Gen. Smith, right, is ex-ambassador to Russia. He talks here with a Soviet attaché.

INSIDE CIA continued

Under "Beetle"

the CIA does not speak of it, some of its employees voluntarily take lie-detector tests. If an employee engaged in particularly "sensitive" work marries, the prospective wife or husband is carefully investigated.

Office trash is shredded and burned in the CIA's own incinerator. When an official wants to destroy confidential notes or work sheets, he does not put them into the wastebasket. They are carefully packed into big envelopes, and then are actually put into his safe, to await the daily collection. Even the ashtrays are emptied by "classified" charwomen, and stenographers are obliged to take their typewriter ribbons out of their machines each night and lock them in the office safe, if secret documents have been typed and if the ribbons are new.

If a CIA official is carrying important documents even on such a short trip as to the Pentagon, it is recommended that he go in a Government car with a chauffeur, trained to know what to do in case of an emergency; for instance, if there should be an accident. On trips out of town, CIA officials themselves never carry important documents, which are transmitted by a special top-secret carrier service.

If a CIA man should be hurt in a traffic accident, or otherwise, wheels instantly move within wheels and he is removed from the jurisdiction of local hospitals or police. If a CIA man should happen to blow up with nervous strain, and have to be placed in some institution—it sometimes happens—he will be taken care of by the organization's own medical staff.

The main CIA building is not identified as such. The gate carries the street number, nothing more. It is, however, listed in the telephone book, because nonlisting would defeat its own purpose by making the organization more rather than less conspicuous. For a time, employees calling at other Government bureaus were forbidden to reveal that they worked for

the CIA, but this had to be given up for the same reason. But the badges CIA officials carry (and which they must show on entering and leaving every installation) do not carry the name of the organization.

One day I met an officer, whom I knew to be a colonel, in civilian dress. I saw him again the next day and he was in uniform. This was because he had to attend a military meeting, and for him to have been out of uniform might have aroused comment. It is really something when a military man wears his uniform as a disguise.

"An intelligence officer who talks about his business ceases to be an intelligence officer," Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, the director of Central Intelligence, said recently. Indeed his men are close-mouthed, and in something like thirty years of journalism I have never encountered an organization so difficult to write about.

Function of CIA Is Explained

Nevertheless the CIA—like the PSB—is willing to treat the visitor with courtesy, and say something. This, too, is as it should be, because both organizations are supported by public funds and owe a definite responsibility to the public.

The Central Intelligence Agency came into being in 1947. Its function, informally stated, is to collect, correlate, analyze, evaluate and disseminate intelligence. It co-operates with other intelligence groups serving the Government—in particular those of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, State Department, and FBI—and attempts to make a clear pattern for all in the field of national security. It has the right to inspect the files of the FBI and other organizations concerned, to the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, and it is responsible only to the National Security Council itself, which means, the President.

The CIA protects the vital interests of the United States outside the country, just as the FBI works inside. The frontier between the CIA and FBI is the coastal fringe of America.

The CIA has offices in more than 20 American cities, and foreign installations scattered from Okinawa to Cyprus. In Washington alone it occupies 34 different buildings, but most of these are small, and they are widely separated throughout the city.

One taboo subject is the number of employees. This figure is so secret that not more than a dozen men in the CIA itself know it. A guess might be 5,000. Another guess might be 10,000.

Another taboo subject is the budget for intelligence. One estimate I heard was \$75,000,000. I do not vouch for it. If that is all it is, the CIA is cheap at the price. It costs \$3,000,000 to build a single jet bomber these days, and \$200,000,000 to equip an armored division.

Not until the Office of Strategic Services was set up under Gen. William J. (Wild Bill) Donovan in World War II did the United States possess an espionage structure on the national level, centrally directed and systematically organized.

Agency Succeeded Wartime OSS

The OSS broke up after the war, and its remains were split between the State Department and the Army. After several years of agony and frustration, it became clear to the people who count in Washington that some new organization must be created. The need was imperative. Hence arose the CIA.

The CIA limped badly at first, and got badly kicked around. Rival departments were reluctant to give up or share their functions, and hated the idea of a new autonomous organization. The State Department, in particular, zealously strove to keep all gathering of political information in its own province. Leadership in the CIA was not forceful enough, and good men melted away. Boners came in the utilization of intelligence, for instance in reference to Korea in 1950, and the CIA was among the organizations blamed.

Two things then occurred, which ended this unhappy situation.

First, a top-secret committee was appointed by Mr. Truman to go over the affairs of the CIA, and rake it from stem to stern. Second, Gen. Walter Bedell (Beetle) Smith was appointed to be director of Central Intelligence in October, 1950. And he has done a job.

Beetle is something special. A smallish, tough, tenacious man, he is the only four-star general in the United States Army who never went to West Point or any other military school. He enlisted in the National Guard, in fact, at the age of 15, spent seven years as a

private and sergeant. He finally won a commission and eventually rose to be Eisenhower's chief of staff in World War II, ambassador to Moscow, commanding general of the First Army and finally boss of the CIA.

Several things help General Smith in the CIA job: (a) He is a full general, and hence the Army respects him. On the other hand, the Army has an ingrown habit of being, on occasion, cool to *any* general who goes back to civilian life. (b) He knows well the art of shopping for men. (c) He had three years of experience on the spot in Moscow, and knows the Russian temperament well. (d) Mr. Truman likes and trusts him.

Above all, though he has been a military man all his life, he understands the civilian point of view. Before he took charge of the CIA it contained a good many Army and Navy officers, most of whom were serving there on routine short term assignments. Smith has brought many more military men into the organization, but he uses them, by and large, as specialists rather than as managers. Also he has brought in many civilians; in fact, all except two of his chief assistants are civilians, and he has made it clear at all times that the CIA is—and must remain—fundamentally a civilian agency.

The General has the power to smack heads together, but seldom does so. His job is not to affront the Army, the AEC, the State Department or the FBI, but to get along with them all.

Of course certain frictions still exist between the CIA and the Pentagon, despite Smith's best efforts. But on the whole the point has been reached—on intelligence—where the Army has to have what the CIA has, more than the opposite.

Gunther Names Men Who Run CIA

No organizational chart of the CIA has ever been published, and the names of most men working for it—even on top levels—are unknown to the public. I have, however, permission to print what follows, though several of the names have hitherto been secret.

Immediately under General Smith is the deputy director, Allen Dulles. A brother of John Foster Dulles, he is a well-known figure in his own right, though people know little of what he did in Switzerland during the war, when he headed the OSS establishment there. His work in helping to bring about German and Italian internal collapse was, it has been soberly stated, worth a brace of allied divisions.

People sacrifice a lot to work for the CIA and Mr. Dulles is no exception. As a lawyer, his earnings were very substantial; he works for the Government for a comparative pittance.

Under Smith and Dulles are three main

departments, each with a deputy director—Covert Activities, Intelligence, and Organization. The man handling Covert Activities is so secret that his name is never divulged.

The deputy director for Intelligence is Loftus Becker, a youthful, dark-haired, slow-spoken New York lawyer and a graduate of the Harvard Law School. He was an intelligence officer with the Ninth Army and then attended the Nuremberg trials as a specialist on German military organizations.

The deputy director for Organization, Walter Reid Wolf, is the organization's business manager, so to speak. He served in World War I as a 2nd lieutenant, went to Yale and became a banker.

Then there is an official known as the inspector-general, who is Stuart Hedden, aged 53. He went to Wesleyan University in Connecticut and to Harvard, became a wealthy businessman and then returned to Wesleyan where he spent ten years as manager of its finances. Hedden is the trouble-shooter for General Smith, the private eye. His function is to go into any part of the organization, and shake it up.

Other CIA Executives Listed

In the Intelligence Division one man who deserves mention is Sherman Kent, the assistant director in the Office of National Estimates. Kent, the organization's chief theoretician, was for many years a professor of history at Yale, who then worked for OSS during the war. He is the author of one of the few textbooks in the field, *Strategic Intelligence*.

Still another figure in the organization is a retired Air Force colonel, Matthew Baird. If Hedden is the private eye and Wolf the business manager, Baird might be called the schoolmaster. He is director of Personnel and Training, and as such touches on affairs clandestine in the extreme.

I talked to all these men, and there are a dozen others I might mention. In Sherman Kent's division are people like Raymond J. Sontag, professor of history at the University of California; former ambassador to China Nelson Johnson; at least one retired lieutenant general and one retired vice admiral, and plenty of Ph.D.'s and intelligence-minded business men.

General Smith, it would seem, has licked one of the most crushing of all Washington problems, that of getting really good men to give up their private careers for service to the Government. The CIA, I heard it said, is the only organization in the capital that can still get top-notch people. One reason is, of course, that they are protected. Congress has little inclination to go after them.

On the lower levels, there are all manner of personnel problems. A man, whether he is

going to serve at a desk or out in the field as a secret agent, needs a lot of training. One hush-hush detail is that, by special act of Congress, the CIA may import into the United States a certain number of aliens every year. One difficulty is, of course, money. No matter what its budget is, the CIA cannot afford to employ all the brains and talent it needs.

Training may go on for years, and can include everything from advanced techniques in electronics to how to pick a lock or undermine a cabinet. The organization is busy now training people who may be useful in 1965 and later.

The CIA doesn't talk about this area of its operations, but it conveys the definite impression that if any enemy plays tough, we know how to play plenty tough too.

To get and train a good man, we will go anywhere. If the best teacher is in Alcatraz, we will go to Alcatraz. It is not unusual to have three or four "instructors," all experts in their individual realms, teaching a single recruit. Women—contrary to some belief—often make excellent agents. No agent is ever told more about his job than is strictly necessary, so that, in the event of capture and torture, he will have comparatively little to reveal.

Novel Aids Help Train Agents

One fascinating item is the language school. The CIA gives instruction in 68 languages, from French to Pushtu, and it can teach an average student to read a Russian newspaper—*Pravda*, say—in a remarkably brief time, by use of novel gadgets and devices. Chinese takes two years and Arabic something less. Another striking item is the optical laboratory, which I was also permitted to see; this improves a student's reading habits, so that he can go through documents faster. Still another is an extraordinary electronic instrument, the only one of its kind in the world (full details may not be given) which automatically selects and reproduces certain types of recorded information by a photographic process.

Only a minor proportion of the CIA's work is "covert," or, in the argot of the trade, "sensitive." The work of secret agents—spies collecting information in friendly or unfriendly territory—is indispensable and can be of paramount necessity, but it is only a fraction of the whole. In these days, the punched cards of International Business Machines are apt to be more important than cloak or dagger. Relentlessly patient analysis of enormous quantities of freely available data probably carries more weight than pilfered papers.

Foreign broadcasts are an important source of information. The CIA has strategically placed listening posts in various parts of the world, and the total "take" is phenomenal

CONTINUED

CIA gets intelligence from spies, other sources; PSB uses

—some three million words a day, which is four and a half times longer than the Bible.

Another important source of information is documents. Ceaselessly the CIA picks up newspapers, magazines, technical journals, reports of all kinds, from every corner of the globe and microscopically scrutinizes what they say.

A fundamental problem in intelligence, one CIA expert told me, is "appropriate guidance from the consumer." It simplifies the work of the CIA immensely if it knows what the "consumer" (Mr. Truman, the National Security Council, or any interested body of the Government) wants to know, and more *why* it wants to know. Suppose a request comes for an analysis of the coastline of Country X. Very good. But what is this analysis for? Mine-laying? Beach assaults? Capacity to grow new types of seaweed? The more refined and detailed the request, the better the CIA can operate. The CIA can deliver, if it gets proper guidance.

These are some things, on various levels, that the CIA might be called upon to find out:

What is current production in Mine #17 in the Czech uranium fields? Is this better than last year? Any labor trouble in this particular mine?

How many of the leading Japanese Communists have been in China recently, and what was their experience there?

How many atomic bombs has the Soviet Union?

Analysis of Facts Is Important

The CIA is an assembly line; it is not the boss. For a large part of its intelligence, it relies on other agencies. So a major question is—How well does it evaluate?

On day-to-day issues, this is the province of a special desk geared for quick action, and its director works much like the city editor of a big newspaper. Suppose a monitored broadcast, a news ticker, or the State Department teletype reports that a West German Communist leader has made a cryptic, unexpected speech saying such-and-such. Will this have any effect on the American position in Berlin? The report is reviewed by expert analysts—who know German and Germany well. In a matter of minutes, the first "flash" will be on the appropriate desk; in a matter of hours, a full report will be ready.

Every afternoon at a certain hour, the day's entire grist of current information is processed. The appraisals are worked over during the evening and are ready for mimeographing by midnight; then they are delivered to the customers the next morning. Some go straight to the President; some go to the Chiefs of Staff.

On long-range matters, the process is more complex. A series of "National Estimates" is steadily in process of being written, on every conceivable variety of topic dealing with the country's interests. These are prepared after elaborate consultation—not merely within the CIA itself—but with representatives of the various agencies who meet with General Smith once a week, like the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Army's G2, Air Force intelligence and State Department experts. Outside people may be called in for consultation; for instance, if a petroleum problem is at issue,

an oil man may be asked for an opinion. Finally, the report goes to a special (and ultra-hush-hush) panel of top-flight civilians *not* in the Government. The membership of this panel shifts according to the problem involved.

The original contributors are empowered to comment on the finished product, and dissenting minority reports are permitted. Then the documents go to the departments concerned, the National Security Council and the President, and become (in theory at least) a solid basis of an overall, integrated national policy.

Some Shortcomings Criticized

These reports, though everybody concedes that they are conscientiously and competently done, have been roundly criticized on occasion on three scores: (1) Since, by and large, so many Government agencies sit in on their production, they are likely to represent the lowest common denominator of opinion. To get agreement, everybody sacrifices something. They are compromises, and compromise on intelligence is bad. (2) The high level people only begin to work after the junior experts have paved the way, and these juniors—being human—are not omniscient. The technical staff at the bottom ought to be better. (3) Even the wisest men are fallible on matters so broad. Suppose we want to calculate the future intentions of Mao Tse-tung toward India, or of India toward Mao Tse-tung. Either calculation will be quite a job.

Who decides what will go all the way up to the President? Answer—the President. Mr. Truman is interested in every aspect of the CIA, and, quite aside from his role in supreme decisions, he likes to keep his finger on everything that is going on.

Should the CIA, instead of being coordinator, be the boss? Should it in other words, take over all other Government intelligence functions? No. One reason is that neither the military nor the State Department would agree. Another is that the CIA does not want to be bothered with purely tactical military intelligence. Another is that, although it has a large scientific section, its function in this field is primarily to be a coordinator, since science is so specialized.

Does the present setup cause too much duplication? Not necessarily. Duplication means competition, which is good.

Can the CIA guarantee against another Pearl Harbor? Certainly not. General Smith has made this clear on several occasions. A sneak attack from the air, or by sabotage, is always possible; no radar screen, no intelligence system, is or ever can be absolutely fool proof. But the CIA thinks that it has produced the focussing mechanism whereby, if a sneak attack does occur, it can be countered with the maximum of promptness and efficiency.

"Intelligence is always an unfinished business. We're never as good as we want to be," says General Smith. "We can't talk about what successes we have achieved, because that would give our hand away."

I met one high official in the Pentagon, an old friend whom I trust. He talked about the achievements of the CIA, and then said, "If only I could tell you some of the things it's done!"

PSB Co-operates with CIA

Turn briefly now to the Psychological Strategy Board—PSB—with which CIA works closely. Just as CIA derives from the old OSS, so does PSB derive (in one sense) from the old Office of War Information. The CIA, generally speaking, is an intelligence agency; the PSB is concerned with cold-war strategy. Neither makes policy, but the PSB has a hand in developing policy.

"Psychological Strategy" really means "Psychological Warfare." This, in turn, means propaganda. The PSB works in all fields of propaganda, both "black" and "white," but most of its activity is too secret for any detailed mention. Both organizations are close-mouthed, PSB only slightly less so than the CIA. Shakespeare described their methods well: "Seal up your lips, and give no words but mum."

The PSB is housed in a smallish double building in the middle of Washington, and there is no name plate on the door.

The Presidential Directive (not Act of Congress) which set up the PSB in 1951 has been published only as a classified document,

Allen Dulles, deputy director of CIA, heads list of talented aides working for Smith. During war, he served with OSS.



Loftus Becker heads CIA Intelligence department. A New York lawyer, he was wartime intelligence officer in Germany.



easels in the Sun

Since 1909, the Summer School of Painting in Saugatuck, Mich., has been successfully combining sun, fun and art.



After crouching in the sand all morning painting weather-worn tree trunks, student Bruce Breckenridge depends trunks, dances wildly across the dunes.



Gladys Jackson stops by to chat with Breckenridge and see how he is doing.



Breckenridge's painting will be criticized at regular Saturday session attended by instructors and students.

To its 5,000-odd former students, the Summer School of Painting in Saugatuck, Mich., known affectionately as "Oxbow." Here, in this magnificent Lake Michigan dune country, thousands of students and art teachers from all over the United States gather to sketch, paint, etch, work in handicrafts and, at week's end, review their work and relax at beach parties and costume dances. The school's 107 acres of woods, fields and dunes is between Oxbow Lagoon and the swift-flowing Kalamazoo river where James Fenimore Cooper once gathered lore for his writings. Less than a mile away is Lake Michigan.

As in most pioneer states, art was a long time aborning in Michigan. Under the directorship of Miss Elsa Ulbricht, who has been with "Oxbow" for 40 years, Saugatuck has become one of the Midwest's principal art colonies.

CONTINUED

it to map strategy

and few in Washington know the organization's complete responsibilities. The name of the director has been printed on occasion, but those of his chief assistants are unpublishable. The organization is small, and its members are hand-picked and elite. They have to pass four different security checks. One of its sub-directors is a well-known professor of philosophy, one a newspaperman with wide political experience in Europe and Asia and one a diplomat who has served in Moscow and Berlin.

Dr. Raymond B. Allen is director. He is a medical man (with both M.D. and Ph.D. degrees) who has a remarkable administrative record. He has never worked for the Government before, except on one brief job. A North Dakotan, Dr. Allen was born in 1902; variously he has been associate dean of the College of Physicians and Surgeons at Columbia University, dean of the Wayne University College of Medicine, executive dean of the medical faculties of Chicago College (University of Illinois), president of the University of Washington in Seattle, and chancellor-designate of the University of California, Los Angeles. Dr. Allen is a forthright, friendly man who wears heavy glasses, has a deep voice, still keeps up with his medicine and has plunged into his onerous job with great acumen and energy.

How the PSB Is Set Up

The PSB is not "operational." It has no budget. What money it needs it gets from other Government departments. Three men, who constitute its board, give direction to Dr. Allen, and pass up their recommendations to the National Security Council and the President. The three are David K. E. Bruce, in his capacity as Undersecretary of State; William C. Foster, in his capacity as Deputy Secretary of Defense, and General Walter Bedell Smith, head of the CIA, who is chairman.

The frontiers between CIA and PSB are not altogether sharp. But suppose, let us say, that Country M, a friendly state, has a troublesome Communist problem and wants help from us. The CIA will explore the situation; then it becomes the function of the PSB to prepare a plan. This plan, when approved, is then turned over to the appropriate operating agency of the Government. The various PSB

"plans" so far prepared and put in operation are, of course, severely classified, and only a few top-flight officials ever see them. Recently, one had to do with proposals for the integration of West Germany into Western Europe.

Partly, PSB was established to smooth out wrangles over spheres of influence between the Pentagon and the State Department, and to eliminate interdepartmental jealousies. The men chiefly responsible for setting it up were Mr. Truman himself, General Smith and Admiral Sidney Souers, former executive secretary of the National Security Council.

In its day-to-day workings, the chief complaints over PSB are that, as with the CIA, its decisions embody too much compromise, and that it takes far too long to reach them. It may take PSB six months or even longer to get a plan ready, because (a) agreement must be reached with all the agencies concerned, and (b) the really vital decisions are on such a Himalayan level. It is one thing to work out a plan for, let us say, combating communism in Germany. It is quite another to work out one on such a question as "What shall be the future American approach to nationalism in the Middle East?" or "What should be done about Arab aspirations in North Africa, considering French interests there?" To answer these, the entire functioning mechanism of the Government, on an extreme long-range-high level, has to be called into play.

PSB is new, and is working hard. Nobody talks about results as yet. One of its top officials told me, "There's no Hooper rating for the kind of stuff we monkey with!"

What We Know About Soviets

The entire complex apparatus described in this article would not, of course, be necessary at all if American relations with the Soviet Union were normal. Congress would not give our intelligence and propaganda services as much as they get if it were not for the Russian threat. Hence, the taxpaying citizen has a right, above all, to ask what the CIA and PSB are doing vis-à-vis the Soviets, how well they are stocking up information and producing plans for the future and what they think of Russian intentions now. Do we really know what the U.S.S.R. is up to?

The Russians are inordinately hard to crack. They are much more impenetrable than were the Germans or Japanese before or during the war.

This serves to make our intelligence work

on the Soviet Union inhumanly difficult. What we rely on most is a fiercely sharp scrutiny of the whole Russian economy, not merely from day to day, but from month to month and year to year. Mainly the job is a slow, detailed, laborious, pedantic, dirty job of meticulously fitting together small bits of information.

The knowledge accumulated is then applied to the crucial problems that confront us—for instance: Do the Russians intend to make a general war?

The CIA might set about analyzing this problem as follows:

1. No prohibitions against war exist in Stalinist doctrine; war is recognized as an instrument in Russian national policy. Therefore, in theory, the possibility of war cannot be ignored.

2. The Russians are a severely realistic people, and, before embarking on war, would be certain to ask themselves if they would gain or lose by such action.

3. To estimate their guesses on this, we have to estimate how well they think they are getting on with their present cold-war tactics. Always we must work on two levels. (a) What do they think, or, rather, what do we think they think? (b) What do we think?

4. If they think they are doing well without war, war is unlikely. Moreover, they must attempt to assess (a) what our response would be to aggressive action in Europe, (b) how vulnerable they are to counter attack. They know well that the American Strategic Air Force exists, and they probably have a good idea of what it could do. Will they make a war, if they know that Moscow will be destroyed the next morning?

5. A vast number of other calculations have to be attempted. For instance, the Russians might think that they could win a short war. But what about a long war, which would bring into play the full power of American industrial production?

6. What about accidents? Could a blunder start a war that no one wanted?

7. Could a civil war in Germany, if one should occur, provoke a general war?

No human being can answer questions like these with certainty or prepare exact plans to take care of them. What the CIA and PSB are trying to do is get the best possible consolidated guess or estimate.

The American people can be sure they are doing a first-class job.

END

Walter Reid Wolf, banker, is in charge of Organization. Head of a third department, Covert Activities, can't be named.



Stuart H. Tedden, as inspector-general of CIA, is a trouble-shooter for Gen. Smith. He's an ex-businessman, college trustee.



Sherman Kent, chief theoretician of the CIA, is assistant director in Office of National Estimates. He's an ex-OSS man.



Dr. Raymond B. Allen is PSB head, works close to CIA in cold-war plans.



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. T. Harbo *RH*

DATE: July 31, 1952

FROM : A. K. Bowles *AKB*SUBJECT: VISIT OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES
TO FBI LABORATORY

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Pursuant to arrangements made through liaison channels, the following men from the Central Intelligence Agency came to the Laboratory and talked with Special Agent James C. Cadiogan and me: [redacted]

They were furnished oral information in connection with [redacted]

b3

[redacted] asked [redacted]

[redacted] He was advised that matter should be brought up through proper liaison channels and it will be considered.

ACTION. None. The above is for record purposes.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-8-99 BY 60267 NIS/EP/DO

368692

cc: Mr. Papich, Room 7647
 AKB:MEG

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62-80750-1897
 7 AUG 8 1952

60 AUG 14 1952

7-1897

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62-80750-1900


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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-9-99 BY 60267NIS/EP/DD
368692

JUL 29 1953

E. J. [unclear]



C

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 2, 1952

FROM : V. P. Keay

b1

b3

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

(S)

(S)

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(S)

(S)

ACTION:

Attached hereto is a letter directed to the Legal
Attache [REDACTED] concerning the instant matter.

SJB:jmr

Attachment

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NIS/EPID
DECLASSIFY ON: [REDACTED]

968692 "Per OGA
6-9-99"

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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81

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EP

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA.

DATE: July 29, 1952

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NIS/EP/DD
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

368692 "Per OGA 6-9-99"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

PURPOSE:

To have the Liaison Section discuss with CIA [redacted]

BACKGROUND:

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

It is noted [redacted]

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That the Liaison Section strongly point out to CIA [redacted]

[redacted] (S)

[redacted]

HWL:elw

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EX-25

162-80750-1904

68 AUG 22 1952

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Nichols _____

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Tele. Room _____

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Gandy _____

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~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 6, 1952

FROM : V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
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Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

G.I.R. 6

Reference is made to memorandum dated July 29, 1952, from Mr. Branigan to you wherein it was recommended that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

This matter was discussed with

CIA.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SJP:lw

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

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6-9-99"

162-80750-1905
JUG 12 1952

by [signature]

50 AUG 20 1952

EX-25

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

ACTION:

It is recommended that the instant matter be referred to the Espionage Section for its information.

ADDENDUM: (fh) 8-7-52

[redacted] CIA, advised that the above matter was directed to the attention of appropriate CIA officials and supervisors. [redacted]

b3

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 6, 1952

FROM : V. P. Keay

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NISLEP/DD
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

368692 "Per OGA"
6.9.99 ✓

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Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
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Gandy _____

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

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[REDACTED] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SJP:jmr:jm

60 AUG 22 1952

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INDEXED - 61 AUG 14 1952EX-251
This is the balance for C.P.
goes on as in recent
article.
SECRET

RFE

~~SECRET~~

Memo to Mr. A. H. Belmont from V. P. Keay

Re:



(S)

b1
b3

ACTION:

None. For your information.

- 2 -
~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AWK*

DATE: August 11, 1952

FROM : V. P. *Kearney*SUBJECT:

b3

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

PC
Boyle
Boyle
Boyle

b3

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:lw

cc - Mr. Harbo

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62-80750-1907

1952

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. T. Harbo *RH*

FROM : A. K. Bowles *Auto*

SUBJECT: VISIT OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES
TO FBI LABORATORY

DATE: August 11, 1952

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Reference is made to my memorandum dated July 31, 1952, regarding the visit of _____

_____ to the Laboratory _____

b3

The above men again visited the Laboratory on August 6, 1952 _____

ACTION. None. The above is for record purposes.

cc: Mr. Papich, Room 7647

Handwritten signature
RECEIVED ALC

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DATE 6-9-99 BY 60267 NIS/EP/DD
368692

EX-25
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162-80750-1909
AUG 13 1952
Handwritten signature

AUG 25 1952

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Anchorage (100-1627)

DATE: August 19, 1952

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED] (S)

*General Intelligence Agency
Central*

Reference Bureau letter to Anchorage dated June 25, 1952.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Jones
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

b1
b3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

*Bonafoy
Jensen
Horton*

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

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b3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

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FEB 11 1953

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DATE 6-9-99 BY 60267 NIS/EP/DD
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *6/13/89*

DATE: August 20, 1952

FROM : V. P. Keay *PK*~~SECRET~~SUBJECT: *C. T. A.* [REDACTED] (S)

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Rm. _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

b1 _____
 b3 _____

b1 _____
 b3 _____

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:lw

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 6-9-99"

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SP7 CJC/ALW

6/15/94 C.A. #88-1826

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ALL classification per
 CDA REVIEW OF 6/14/94

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INDEXED - 55

62-80750-1912

~~SECRET~~

60 AUG 29 1952

5
mc

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT ✓

DATE: August 14, 1952

FROM : V. P. Keay *VPK*~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

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b3

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:lw

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 4/7/93 C.A. #88-1826

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SP 7 CLE/AGM
 6/15/94 C.A. #88-1826
 ALL CLASSIFICATION PER
 CIA REVIEW of 6/2/94

RECORDED - 47

62-80750-1913

EX-99

~~SECRET~~

60 SEP 21 1952

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 21, 1952

FROM : V. P. Keay / *VPK*

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Harbo	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Rm.	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

b1
b3

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

EX-25

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NIS/EP/DD
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X368692 "Per OGA
6-9-99"

RECORDED - 134

62-80750-1914

13 AUG 26 1952

JMM:lng:jmr:dmc

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58 SEP 3 1952

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memo to Mr. A. H. Belmont
from V. P. Keay
RE: [REDACTED] (S)

August 19, 1952

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (S)

ACTION:

None. For your information.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nichols

DATE: August 25, 1952

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY 60267NIS/EP/DO
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X [REDACTED]

368692 "Per OGA 6-9-99"

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

b1

b3

b1

b3

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

cc - Mr. V. P. Keay

JTM:mcf

RECORDED - 58

INDEXED - 58

162-80750-1916

EX. - 103

AUG 27 1952

SEP 8 1952

~~SECRET~~

The Director

August 15, 1952

D. M. Ladd

~~DECLASSIFIED BY~~

WALTER WINCHELL'S COLUMN,
WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 11, 1952

You will recall that Winchell's column appearing in the Washington Post, August 11, 1952, carried a comment reading, "The FBI and CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) say such profane things about each other--even Pravda couldn't print them."

You will also recall that you transmitted a letter dated August 12, 1952, to Mr. Winchell, advising him that, insofar as the FBI is concerned, there is no basis for the statement appearing in his column. In accordance with your instructions, a copy of that letter was shown to General Smith by Liaison Agent Papich.

General Smith advised Papich that a few CIA officers, expressing some concern, had directed his attention to the Winchell comment. He stated that he personally did not attach much significance to the comment, primarily because he felt that the relations between the CIA and the FBI are not of a nature to give rise to any such statements. He added that he knew of no situation or incident which might have given rise to Winchell's statement.

General Smith advised that he appreciated very greatly the Director's attitude as reflected in the letter directed to Winchell. He stated that CIA was not making any type of inquiry in order to ascertain the basis for Winchell's comment. He advised that, if the Bureau developed any information indicating that CIA personnel might be responsible in any way, he would appreciate receiving the pertinent details. General Smith stated that, as far as he was concerned, the CIA and the Bureau undoubtedly would have differences from time to time, and he commented, "I think we are big enough to settle our problems like men." General Smith then made the following comment regarding newspaper columnists. He stated that he personally was afraid of Winchell and Pearson and made a point of not getting involved with them.

Tolson	
Ladd	
Nichols	
Belmont	
Clegg	
Glavin	
Harbo	
Rosen	
Tracy	
Mohr	
Tele. Rm.	
Nease	
Gandy	

SJP:amk

NOT RECORDED

147 AUG 1952

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/22/86 BY SP6BJA/gc1

1 ENCL.

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Nease
Gandy

SEP 5 1952

62-80750-2

Memo from D. M. Ladd to the Director

8-15-52 , Re: WALTER WINCHELL'S COLUMN, WASHINGTON POST,
August 11, 1952

ACTION:

In the event information is received indicating that CIA personnel may have been responsible for the Winchell comment, it is suggested that General Smith be informed via Liaison channels.

copy:nom

~~SECRET~~

MR. A. H. BELMONT

August 28, 1952

MR. C. E. HENNRICH

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b1
b3

(S)

(S)

CEH:LL

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67 SEP 17 1952

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62-80750-✓

NOT RECORDED

102 SEP 11 1952

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-47765-15

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION:

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(S)

(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *de*

FROM : V. P. Keay *VPK*

SUBJECT: LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DATE: August 20, 1952

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-9-99 BY 60267NIS/EP/DO

368692

Tolson ☒

Ladd ☒

Nichols ☒

Belmont ☒

Clegg ☐

Glavin ☐

Harbo ☐

Rosen ☐

Tracy ☐

Mohr ☐

Tele. Rm. ☐

Nease ☐

Gandy ☐

You will recall that Kirkpatrick recently was stricken with polio and was confined to Gallinger Hospital.

For your information, Kirkpatrick is now a patient at the Walter Reed Hospital. He is no longer in a danger stage but he continues to be partially paralyzed in one leg and one arm. General Smith advised the Liaison Agent that he expects Kirkpatrick to be under treatment for a lengthy period and stated that although he hoped for the best, Kirkpatrick possibly could be confined to a wheelchair for years.

General Smith has been visibly shaken by Kirkpatrick's illness. He apparently not only has a great respect for Kirkpatrick's ability but it appears that a close friendship has developed between the two men. General Smith indicated that he had hoped to groom Kirkpatrick as a future Director of the CIA.

b3

For your information, General Smith advised that the letters to Mr. Kirkpatrick from the Director and Mr. Ladd were most timely and greatly boosted the spirits of Kirkpatrick. General Smith stated that the letters certainly were most thoughtful gestures. You will recall General Smith has already expressed his appreciation to the Director by letter.

Kirkpatrick is able to receive visitors on a very limited basis. In the event any Bureau official desires to call on him, arrangements should be made through [redacted] via the Liaison Agent.

b3

SJP:lw

cc - Mr. Ladd

RECORDED - 104

INDEXED - 104

AUG 20 1952

SEP 10 1952

EX-73

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : V. P. Keady

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

DATE: August 22, 1952

~~SECRET~~b1
b3

Tolson _____

Ladd _____

Nichols _____

Belmont _____

Clegg _____

Glavin _____

Harbo _____

Rosen _____

Tracy _____

Mohr _____

Tele. Rm. _____

Nease _____

Gandy _____

RB

You will recall that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:lw

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368692 "Per OGA

6-9-99"

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SP7 CAC/ASW/PP-1826

6/15/94 C.A. #88-1826

ALL CLASSIFICATION per CIA

Review of 6/2/94

RECORDED-33

INDEXED-33

EX-660

AUG 27 1952

68 SEP 8 1952

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. V. P. Keay

DATE: August 4, 1952

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: ~~INFORMATION FROM CIA ON STATUS~~
OF WORLD COMMUNISM
SECURITY MATTER - CTolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-9-99 BY 60267 NIS/EP/DD

368692

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is to ascertain whether or not CIA can furnish us quarterly with a brief resume of the status of world Communism.

BACKGROUND:

You will recall that at a recent Security - Espionage Conference some SAC's stated that it would be quite helpful to the field if they were to receive a short memorandum on a quarterly basis from the Bureau which would give them a compact, succinct description of the world Communist movement. The SAC's are of the opinion that in the possession of this information they will have a much better grasp of the Communist movement in this country which they are combating day in and day out.

DETAILS:

There are two ways of getting this information. One is to spend a great deal of time in research and review of documents furnished this Bureau, and the other is to get the data from CIA, who is charged with the responsibility of advising the United States on the status of world Communism. This second method is undoubtedly the better method and will take very little time at the Central Research Desk.

In the light of the above, it is believed quite desirable for Bureau Liaison to ask CIA if it will provide the Bureau with a short five- to ten-page summary every three months outlining the status of the world Communist movement, with particular emphasis on its strength and weaknesses and changes of policy, if any, in the major regions of the world. Likewise of particular importance in such a summary would be any information ascertained by CIA in foreign countries concerning Communism which has a bearing,

WCS:amk

EX - 28

RECORDED - 91

INDEXED - 91

100-84750-1921

AUG 20 1952

74 DEC 8 1952

direct or indirect, upon either the Communist movement in this country or our government per se.

There is no doubt that CIA possesses this information and provides high-ranking officials of the Government with such data regularly. Hence it should be no trouble for CIA, via Bureau Liaison, to send the data over here. On the receipt of the information at the Bureau, it can be reduced if necessary to a two- or three-page memorandum and sent to the field quarterly. In some instances, we would have some additional information to incorporate in the memorandum which would be of interest and value to the field.

ACTION:

It is recommended that Bureau Liaison ask CIA to provide us with such a summary memorandum every three months.

ADDENDUM:

August 11, 1952

The above matter was discussed with [redacted] who expressed the opinion that steps could be taken to provide the Bureau the desired information. He explained that at the present time CIA is not preparing periodic summaries to fit Bureau needs. [redacted] will confer with members of his research desk and with other officers of CIA with the view of giving necessary consideration to the above recommendation. Liaison will follow.

SJP/fjb

b3

62-80750-1922

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64-35693-272-1

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-9-99 BY 60267 NIS/EP/DD

368692

JUL 29 1953

C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE August 24, 1958

FROM : MR. V. P. KE/K

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-9-99 BY 65767 NUS/ERO

SUBJECT :

368692

b3

~~Linton~~
~~Paul~~
P. Huls
He mont
Cerk
Clayton
Habit
Rosen
Tracy
Gess
Mahr
Winterman
Ialc. P.
Hullor as
Lizon
Miss AKJ

Reference is made to memorandum dated August 19, 1953, from Mr. Ladd to you wherein information was set forth concerning the refugee bill which will permit approximately 209,000 refugees to come to the United States.

b3

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ACTION:

None. The Liaison Section will follow this matter for any information of pertinent interest to the Bureau. 80750-1

SJP: t'7b

S.P. 25 1953

162-80750
NOT RECORDED

85 OCT 1 1953

295-02 OCT 7 1953

62-80750-1924

CHANGED TO

64-35693-256-1

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368692

JUL 29 1953

C